Colombia: Will FARC Rise Again From the Ashes?
DEVELOPMENTS
On Sunday July 20th, 2008, former hostage and Colombian Senator Ingrid Betancourt led a demonstration to end the longstanding conflict between Colombia and the guerrilla group that captured her, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Global demonstrations in France, Colombia, and elsewhere joined Ms. Betancourt’s efforts to end FARC violence,and have resulted in thousands of calls for peace in Colombia and an end to kidnapping, a common practice of the guerrillas.
In recent months, the Colombian state launched a series of successful military initiatives against FARC. Incursions by the Colombian military included an operation into Ecuadorian soil that resulted in the the capture of a laptop detailing FARC operations. The raid also resulted in the death of Mr. Reyes, a top commander who sources had cited as a potential replacement for Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulanda, FARC’s recently deceased top commander. It seems to have been a turning point for successful Colombian operations against the guerrillas.
BACKGROUND
FARC is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groupbased in remote areas of Colombia where the state has no effective control. FARC was established in 1964 as the military branch of the Communist Party. FARC is not the only guerrilla group that remains active in the country, since the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), also known as the National Liberation Army, still remains active in Colombia. However, FARC is by far the largest and best-financed guerrilla group, not only in Colombia, but within the entire Western Hemisphere, with an estimated 9,000 to 12,000 combatants.
The roots of the Colombian conflict are deep. The source of the conflict may be traced to the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948, the presidential candidate for Colombia’s Liberal party. His death sparked a period of internecine conflict, known as “La Violencia” or “the Violence.” Although a power sharing agreement effectively ended La Violencia, the seeds of the present conflict had already been sown. FARC emerged in Colombia in the 1960s, at a time where Colombia, like other Latin American countries, witnessed the rise of multiple leftist revolutionary movements in reaction to endemic poverty, social inequality, and the success of the Cuban revolution.
The factors fueling Colombia’s current protracted conflict have been compounded by drug trafficking, as organized crime has dominated the worldwide supply of cocaine for decades. The rise of cocaine exports in the late 1970s not only provided a source of funding for guerrilla organizations, but also contributed to Colombia’s security crises and undermined the nation’s institutions. FARC and other guerrilla groups began to supplement their incomes by exacting taxes from narco-traffickers and kidnapping wealthy Colombians for high ransoms.
Columbia’s situation became even more complicated in the 1980s with the emergence of strong paramilitary groups-- illegally armed right-wing military forces within the country. The paramilitaries began as landowner self-defense groups formed largely with the consent and often the direct support of the Colombian military, but they eventually evolved into yet another threat to the rule of law in Colombia. As many as 75% of political murders in Colombia have been perpetrated by paramilitaries, reports Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based NGO.
Throughout the evolution of the conflict, the Colombian government has engaged in an alternating carrot-and-stick approach in dealing with both FARC and the paramilitaries. While the government engaged in multiple attempts to negotiate with FARC, the last serious effort to compromise ended in failed peace talks led by then-President Andres Pastrana in 2002. In 2004, Alvaro Uribe was elected president on a platform of public security that advocated a strict policy against FARC, which now in his administration’s second term appears to have been quite successful.
ANALYSIS
The recent string of operations against FARC reveals that the organization is in disarray. The death of Mr. Marulanda and Mr. Reyes deprived FARC of two members of its six-person leadership secretariat. The killing of FARC commander Ivan Rios by his own troops, who then collected bounty on his head, evince the declining morale within FARC. The July 2nd raid freeing 15 hostages, including Ms. Betancourt, dramatically highlighted FARC’s seeming decline to the world.
Moreover, FARC has clearly lost the battle for public support. While fewer than 5% of Colombians support FARC’s activities, domestic support for Mr. Uribe and his anti-FARC policies has skyrocketed above 90%. Moreover, the intensifying international spotlight on FARC’s inhumane treatment of captives has pressured many prominent longtime sympathizers such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Cuba’s Fidel Castro to publicly distance themselves from FARC and its tactics.
These developments suggest that the end of FARC is imminent. However, the Colombian government estimates FARC still has 700 hostages under its control in remote jungle areas, although it is likely that the actual number is lower. Besides FARC’s long history of struggle and the commitment of its top brass, the illegal cocaine trade between Colombia and the U.S. remains a lucrative multibillion-dollar industry that continues to finance FARC’s operations. These factors make the likelihood of a rapid collapse less likely.
A key determinant of FARC’s future will be how President Uribe’s government or any subsequent administration implements policies to deal with the terrorist group. President. Uribe may get yet another term to continue his anti-FARC policies: while he has faced several major scandals relating to close ties between his political party and the AUC, as well as the use of a Red Cross badge by Colombian guerrillas in the rescue of Ms. Betancourt, the government’s success in tackling FARC has led to growing political momentum to amend the Colombian constitution to permit Mr. Uribe to run for a third term. Thus, it is unclear who will emerge as Colombia’s next president.
FARC has historically proven adept at utilizing periods of political dialogue to strengthen itself militarily, thus it may again attempt to seek a similar strategy of in looking to reform its leadership structure. It is unclear how Alfonso Cano, the new FARC leader, will deal with mounting domestic and international pressure to free the hostages that remain under his control.
While past attempts at negotiation with FARC have proven unsuccessful, the FARC has arguably never been in such a precarious position. It appears possible that both sides will be more open to genuinely pursuing a lasting peace with dignity than ever before. The next few months are likely to prove crucial in whether permanent peace in one of the world’s most intractable conflicts may finally be within reach. Even such an agreement, however, could be a source of continued instability, as the demobilization of this guerrilla group would create serious power gaps in the international cocaine trade.