Georgia and Russia: The Search for Peace, Stability and Territorial Integrity
BACKGROUND
Georgia is strategically located at the juncture of Western Asia and Eastern Europe, on the Black Sea between Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Post-independence in 1991, the bloodless Rose Revolution deposed President Eduard Shevardnadze after a fraudulent election in 2003, and the Western-leaning Mikheil Saakashvili came to power. The government has since put in place a series of institutional reforms leading to impressive economic growth, based on a movement away from agriculture and towards a more service oriented economy.
Georgia is a critical U.S. ally in the Caucasus region for a number of reasons: its strategic position (on oil and gas pipeline and energy security issues for example), Western orientation (demonstrated in its efforts to join NATO and the EU), and support for the war in Iraq and counter-terrorism efforts (through the provision of troops and joint training programs). President George W. Bush was a vocal proponent of Georgian membership in NATO despite strong Russian opposition to such an arrangement, an issue that in part stoked tensions ahead of the war last year when Georgia pushed for a roadmap for accession to the organization at the NATO Summit in Bucharest. The Obama administration remains supportive of NATO membership for Georgia and for Georgian territorial integrity. In a visit to Tbilisi in July, Vice President Joe Biden strongly denounced Russia’s “19th century notion of spheres of influence”. The key for the United States and its NATO allies now, however, is to think beyond rhetoric of this sort and towards a partnership with Georgia which will both allow the Georgian government to create an inclusive, prosperous and secure state and also ensure peaceful coexistence with a resurgent Russia.
ANALYSIS
Going forward, state-building in Georgia will require a movement away from the zero-sum thinking that has dominated Russian-Georgian relations, and towards a positive sum arrangement in which areas of potential cooperation are identified and built-upon, and areas of dispute are minimized and discussed through legitimate channels rather than through the use of violence. The U.S. and international community can catalyze this process by intelligent engagement that supports Georgian goals and generates sustainable national capacity while also recognizing Russian concerns.
Four central ideas may be important:
Pressure will be needed on both sides to ensure that the current ceasefire is respected and continued efforts can be made to deal with the after-effects of last year’s conflict, including resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and rebuilding of homes and infrastructure. Without basic human security, broader stability will be impossible.
Dealing with the causes of the current problems in Georgia over the longer term means ensuring an inclusive state of which the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia want to be a part, through support for governance reforms where feasible, decentralization of power where relevant, and improved, better coordinated development efforts where necessary.
Improved economic integration in the Caucasus could provide the platform upon which to base political progress, as was the case with the creation of the EU. The Russian economic blockade of Georgia and the Georgian veto of Russian accession to the WTO and recent withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States are problematic, but not insurmountable. Georgia has strong trade links with Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and a recent poll indicates that despite the recent conflict, Georgians want to maintain economic and cultural ties with Russia. The key will be to focus carefully on critical sectors and understand how economic tools can best be deployed to generate investment and mobilize resources.
Finally, the Georgian issue must be conceptualized within the larger-framework of post-Cold War politics and Western-Russian relations, as it is only through a broader approach that Georgia’s problems will ultimately be resolved. The Obama administration declared shortly after coming to power that it wants to “reset US-Russian relations.” This requires a ‘modernization alliance’ of sorts with Russia, that allows for progress on Georgia to be balanced with movement on other global problems, from Afghanistan, to the Iranian nuclear issue, to arms control and human rights.
These steps will by no means be easy to put in place or quick to implement. The Georgia-Russia war ended in a difficult ceasefire which has not provided security or lasting peace for Georgians or Russians. Indeed, Russia’s intransigence and repression have also stoked the conflicts in the breakaway territories of Chechnya and Ingushetia recently, making the larger region extremely volatile and political progress even more difficult. These are important issues for the United States and its allies for humanitarian, political, security and economic reasons. The Obama administration should now adopt an approach to Georgia that supports state-building objectives, but recognizes Russian interests and sentiments while understanding where progress can be made and compromises forged. For both the people of Georgia and Russia, this is increasingly imperative.
Blair Glencorse works on state-and market-building issues at the Institute for State Effectiveness.