Iran and the Next Administration
DEVELOPMENTS
Over the course of the Presidential campaign, John McCain and Barack Obama have clashed repeatedly over US policy toward Iran. McCain has staked out a hawkish position in contrast to Obama's willingness to negotiate directly with the Iranian regime. In practice, though, the two candidates' policies would likely be more similar to each other, and to the approach of the Bush administration, than campaign rhetoric would suggest. A variety of factors will limit the next President's freedom of action and will make either a U.S.-Iranian military confrontation or a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough unlikely over the next four years.
Barack Obama has indicated his willingness to meet with Iranian leaders while criticizing the Bush administration’s reluctance to engage in direct diplomacy with Tehran. At a Democratic primary debate in July 2007, Obama declared that he would be willing to meet with Iran’s leaders "without precondition" during the first term of his administration. Although Obama later clarified his statement, explaining that lower-level talks would have to precede any meeting between himself and the Iranian leadership, he has stood by his determination to “engage in tough direct diplomacy with Iran.” At his first debate with McCain, Obama declared that the Bush administration's failure to engage with the Iranians has "actually accelerated their efforts to get nuclear weapons." Obama has argued that the United States must "show Iran -- and especially the Iranian people -- what could be gained from fundamental change: economic engagement, security assurances, and diplomatic relations."
John McCain has taken a much more hawkish stance toward Iran. He has called Iran "the world's chief state sponsor of terrorism" and warned that nuclear weapons in Iranian hands would pose an "existential threat" to Israel that might lead to a "second Holocaust." McCain stated that even if Iran did not attack Israel directly, Tehran could transfer nuclear weapons to one of its allied terrorist networks like Hezbollah. McCain has attacked Obama's proposal to meet with Iranian leaders as dangerously naive. He has also criticized Tehran's role in Iraq, including supplying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and training groups of insurgents. In McCain’s view, the United States can shape Iranian behavior most effectively by putting economic, political, and military pressure on Tehran rather than through high-level negotiations.
The differences between the two candidates, however, may not be as dramatic as their rhetoric suggests. Obama has called Iran "a rogue regime" and a "radical theocracy" and stated unequivocally that the United States "cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran" because Iranian nuclear weapons would endanger Israel and provoke a regional arms race. Obama has refused to rule out the possible use of force against Iran, and even when he has called for diplomacy, he has stressed that it must be accompanied by tightened sanctions against the regime in Tehran.
McCain recommends a similar policy approach to Iran. He has argued that although the threat of military action must remain on the table, it is not "the preferred option." He recommends putting pressure on Iran through tougher international sanctions, if necessary through a "League of Democracies" that would bypass the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto in the U.N. Security Council.
BACKGROUND
Iran’s oil wealth and military capabilities have guaranteed its strategic relevance in the region. Iran's ties with Hamas, Hezbollah and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq allow Tehran to influence political developments in the Arab world. The elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 also removed Iran's longstanding regional rival and facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in Iraq and other countries across the Middle East.
U.S.-Iranian relations have been troubled for decades, although the rivalry has intensified in recent years. Since the Iranian Revolution – which transformed Iran from a monarchy to an Islamic republic -- and the hostage crisis of 1979 – where Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran -- Washington and Tehran have had no formal diplomatic ties. Under the Bush Administration, U.S.-Iranian tensions have increased, and both Washington and Tehran have stepped up their rhetoric against each other. In President Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech, he named Iran as a member of the "Axis of Evil" along with Iraq and North Korea, while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has fiercely criticized the United States and its support for Israel. The United States and Iran have also clashed over Tehran’s ties with Hamas and Hezbollah, its support for Shi’ite militias in Iraq, and a variety of other issues.
Most worrying of all to the United States is the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. Although the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Tehran had halted the military portion of its nuclear program in late 2003, Iran has continued to enrich uranium and move closer to a nuclear capability. The NIE warned that at a minimum, Iran is keeping open the option of restarting its weapons program. Some observers believe that by the time the next President takes office, Iran may be only months away from producing a nuclear device. The threat of nuclear weapons in Iranian hands has raised the possibility of U.S. military action against Iran.
ANALYSIS
Both candidates are likely to find the military option unattractive for several reasons. Iran's nuclear program is spread out among a number of facilities, some of which (such as the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz) are underground or hardened against attack, so it would be difficult to eliminate the entire program with a single air strike like the Israeli operation that destroyed the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981. A longer bombing campaign or ground invasion, on the other hand, would be costly and could place additional burdens on the American military, already under strain as a result of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A U.S. attack on Iran could also endanger U.S. interests elsewhere in the Middle East. Iran might increase the flow of weapons into Iraq and encourage its Iraqi proxies to target U.S. troops, and it could push Hezbollah and Syria to stir up further unrest against the U.S.-backed Siniora government in Lebanon. Iran’s position near the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz could allow it to disrupt the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the rest of the world in the event of war. A U.S. strike on Iran could also spark international opposition, including criticism from traditional American allies.
But if open conflict between the United States and Iran is unlikely over the next four years, so is a major diplomatic breakthrough. Even if Iran does not pursue its nuclear program further, a number of other issues divide Tehran and Washington, including Iranian ties with Hezbollah and the Syrian regime and the Iranian regime’s treatment of religious minorities and domestic political opponents. Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric against Israel has also harmed Iran’s image in the United States and could hinder a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. Iran’s domestic political structure is also rather complex and opaque to outside observers, and even if the Iranian regime decides to improve relations with the United States, conservative elements within the government and the Shi’ite clergy could act to block such a move. Anything as far-reaching as full normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations should not be expected under the next administration.
These constraints will limit the ability of the next administration to achieve dramatic changes in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. The most likely outcome is something similar to what has occurred under the Bush administration -- there will be limited U.S.-Iranian negotiations (through intermediaries if necessary) over issues such as Iran's nuclear program and its policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but these negotiations will often be accompanied by harsh rhetoric and public hostility on both sides.
In fact, much of the initiative in the U.S.-Iranian relationship may not lie with Washington at all. If Iran succeeds in constructing and testing a nuclear device in the next four years, it could spark a major new diplomatic or military crisis with the United States. On the political front, Amhadinejad will be up for reelection in June 2009, and the tone of U.S.-Iranian relations may change if he does not win a second term. There is also the possibility that Israel may choose to act on its own to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program, although Tel Aviv would be unlikely to launch a strike without Washington's approval or at least acquiescence. U.S.-Iranian relations could well be affected more by these events than by any decision the next administration makes on its own.
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Victor McFarland is a PhD student in the Department of History at Yale University, where he studies 20th-century U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.