Renewed Rebel Offensive in Chad: An Analysis
DEVELOPMENTS
Only four months after Chadian rebels attacked and briefly occupied the capital city of N’Djamena, hostilities renewed in the east of Chad on June 11th. Over a one-week period the National Alliance (NA) rebellion, a conglomeration of three rebel groups, quickly captured towns of strategic importance along the route to the capital. The rapid progress of the rebel armies led to a tense environment in N’Djamena, where U.N. and Western forces were contemplating evacuation.
However, on June 19th a “decisive victory” for the Chadian military in the town of Am Zoer, nearly 500 miles northeast of the capital, turned the tides of the onslaught and seemingly put an end to the most recent round of fighting. The NA is denying that this defeat marks the end of their current campaign, although it remains to be seen how they will regroup after such heavy losses. Rebel forces will most likely return to their safe haven in Darfur where they are allegedly funded and trained by the government in Khartoum.
BACKGROUND
Chad has reached the brink of all out civil war multiple times since 2006. The persistant deterioration of the security situation results from two main drivers. First, President Deby’s semi-authoritarian regime has resulted in “the absence of domestic political space” and “militarized all political differences in the country.” Deby’s 18 years in power have been marked by coup attempts and rebellions that were violently suppressed. There has been “systematic, large scale embezzlement of state revenues triggering an unprecedented social crisis at a time [when] oil revenues should have allowed Chadians to live better.” When running for his third term, President Deby had to contend with a large number of defections by senior officials as well as multiple assassination attempts. Although the results of the most recent election were challenged by the opposition groups, the international community quickly accepted the outcome in order to avoid further destabilization, while calling for democratization.
Second, the corrupt socio-political environment in Chad has consistently radicalized opposition parties. During that time, the Zaghawa (the president’s ethnic group) have generously funded the Darfur rebels and provided them with sanctuary in Chad, as well as weapons to continue their struggle against the government of Sudan. This support for Darfur rebels has resulted in a tit-for-tat (common for East Africa) competition with the Sudanese government in Khartoum, which has in turn funded, supplied, and provided safe-haven for the radicalized Chadian rebel groups that make up the NA. The armed opposition to President Deby, however, mostly reflects fringe or minority groups in the population. A forceful regime change brought about by a successful NA campaign would be unlikely to bring any stability to the troubled country.
ANALYSIS
There are two main developments that have made this new offensive different from previous incursions. First, analysts see a possible shift in tactics used by the NA. Although their rhetoric is similar to that during February’s assault, with chest-beating claims of taking N’Djamena by force, their actions show a shift to an apparent strategy of a war of attrition in the East. Bjoern Seibert, of the Fletcher School, opined that “The rebels are staging a show of strength and seeking to underline President Deby’s weakness and inability to control the whole Chadian territory.” Essentially, this offensive seems to have been more of a public relations campaign than a serious attack on the infrastructure of Chad. All rebel “victories” have been immediately announced by spokesmen based in Sudan and France, and they are broadcast widely by the international media. This point is further illustrated by the hit-and-run tactics of the NA. They enter a town, briefly occupy it, then melt back into the bush. NA spokesmen will next claim there was no resistance by the Chadian military or residents, thus giving the appearance of rebel military strength and support by the local populations. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the NA actually had concrete plans to take the offensive all the way to N’Djamena due to the fact that seasonal heavy rains have made much of central Chad impassable. Instead, many analysts feel that the primary goal for the rebels was to force their way back to the negotiating table without actually having to attack the capital city.
The second development of importance concerns President Deby’s European backers who have announced their intention to remain neutral. Previous government successes against the rebels were due primarily to French logistical and intelligence support. In an announcement on June 16th, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated in unequivocal terms that France “will not intervene any more in the Chadian conflict.” This announcement was treated with satisfaction by the rebel forces. President Deby condemned the international community in a nationally broadcast address for not coming to his aid despite his recent refusal to meet with a UN Security Council delegation visiting N’Djamena. Although the current round of fighting seems to be over and the UNHCR has resumed its role in the twelve refugee camps in the east, it remains to be seen how France’s refusal to back President Deby will affect the long-term stability of the Deby presidency.