Something Old, Something New: Security Issues to Watch in 2009
DEVELOPMENTS
European leaders face a burgeoning inbox of new strategic challenges as 2009 begins. Addressing the fallout from the global economic crisis, working with the incoming Obama administration, and determining the future of NATO operations in Afghanistan are likely to be at the forefront of their collective consciousness. This year may also realize crucial opportunities for newly recognized threats to international security. In December, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will meet in Copenhagen to attempt to forge a new international agreement on climate change, as making headway on this issue likely to be high on European leaders’ agendas.
While these challenges have been fairly well documented, a more traditional security concern – strategic nuclear arms-control and non-proliferation – is likely to weigh heavily on leaders’ minds in 2009. In a throwback to the Cold War, a critical component of the framework that regulates nuclear weapons between Russia and the U.S. known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is set to expire in December 2009. No follow-up mechanisms have been agreed, and if START simply runs out there will no longer be measures in place for each side to openly monitor and inspect the other’s nuclear inventories. European leaders are wary that current tensions between Russia and the West – over the Georgia crisis, gas supplies, and missile defense – could continue to leave progress in the arena of nuclear cooperation stymied. This could potentially complicate wider non-proliferation efforts, particularly the situation surrounding Iran’s (ostensibly civil) nuclear program.
BACKGROUND
Arms control agreements, such as START, emerged in part as recognition on both the U.S. and Soviet sides of the crippling economic costs of nuclear ‘arms-racing.’ START, which entered into force in 1991, is an important treaty not only because it was the first to require the elimination of U.S. and Soviet - now Russian - nuclear weapons systems, but also because it allowed for intrusive monitoring. This level of transparency was previously unheard of in an area of such closely guarded national security interests.
What would be the harm of letting START simply pass into the night? In a Wall Street Journal commentary from January 2008, an esteemed group of former U.S. Secretaries of State outlined a compelling set of arguments as to why international treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation are still relevant. They argue that as access to nuclear technologies becomes more widespread, the threat of weapons proliferating to ‘rogue’ states or extremist groups increases; therefore, regulation and ultimately reduction has become even more important.
Yet under the Bush Administration, disarmament efforts took a backseat to policies that emphasized nuclear pre-eminence. To address the emerging proliferation threat, the Bush Administration augmented its deterrence capabilities through the development of new ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons and technologies like ballistic missile defenses.
The missile defense issue in particular has provoked a great deal of debate and controversy in Europe. The theory is that forward-based tracking stations combining highly advanced radars and ground-based interceptor missiles would be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. This would serve as a hedge against a “doomsday scenario”: a state such as Iran or Syria developing and choosing to launch a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile against U.S. assets or its regional allies.
Yet many Europeans remain skeptical. Aside from concerns over whether the technology actually works, they question whether the
threat that missile defense is designed to counter may even emerge in the foreseeable future. Their main point of contention is that
deploying U.S. missile defense assets in Europe is A) unnecessary and B) unnecessarily provocative of Russia. The U.S. has consistently
stated that missile defense is a purely defensive system. However, Russia argues that the forward deployment of sophisticated
interceptors in Europe, specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic, intrudes upon its security. They have warned of a new arms race and have threatened a number of possible "retaliatory steps" including the deployment of short range missiles along its border.
ANALYSIS
In isolation, START’s expiration may seem like a benign matter with little in the way of obvious fallout – intelligence agencies may have to work a little harder to obtain information that was previously readily available. But the issue is connected to a wider set of security questions. Under START, President Reagan’s “trust, but verify” maxim holds true. Without START, or something comparable, a deficit of “verify” would occur at a time when “trust” is hard to come by. The Europeans are concerned looking forward that this could snowball into an increasingly unstable security situation. Whether a follow-on agreement can be reached over the next year is a matter of significant debate.
A ripple effect from this instability is undeniable. The international community tends to takes notice when the two countries that possess close to 95% of the nuclear weapons in existence dither over decisions on the future of these forces. If no agreement is reached, there is a danger that so-called ‘nuclear aspirants’ (read: Iran) would have even less motivation to abide by non-proliferation measures. Non-nuclear states could legitimately question why they should exercise restraint or adopt more rigorous controls over their civil nuclear programs when the nuclear-weapons states are treating their disarmament commitments with such apparent disdain.
To help resolve such an impasse, there must be engagement on multiple levels. Bilateral talks need to be complemented by regional and multilateral actions. For example, on missile defense the NATO path could be explored – through existing forums such as the NATO-Russia Council. The Europeans can certainly play a role. What offers some hope is that, ironically, a catalyst in the past for breakthroughs in arms-control agreements between the U.S. and Russia has been a situation where trust is absent. START was conceived at the height of the Cold War when President Reagan was proposing the creation of a Strategic Defense Initiative or “Star Wars” missile defense system. Europe will be monitoring closely how the situation unfolds in 2009 in the hope that tense times can focus attention on the pressing need to achieve an outcome that enhances security in the region.
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Paul Flach is an analyst with Kroll in New York. He previously worked for the UK Ministry of Defence in London and as a consultant to the Center for International Cooperation at NYU. He writes in an independent capacity.